Discussing the Unspoken Aspects of IRCA:
“The
possible passage of a new immigration law in the United
States has generated animated responses from numerous
groups and institutions in Mexico
intent on analyzing the migratory situation and the possible repercussions of
such legislation.”
By the time
that Senate bill 1200 reached President Reagan’s desk on November 6, 1986, it
had spent over four years passing through the halls of congress; It had been
revisited, reconsidered, and rewritten numerous times in its lengthy history.
Prior to its passage, the bill was known as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, named
after its two sponsors in the houses of Congress. Once enacted, however, it
became known as the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). This act
promised to bolster US border patrol resources and place heavy fines on
employers who knowingly hired undocumented workers. In exchange for these
punitive measures, IRCA also allowed for an increase in the number of temporary
agricultural work visas as well as a path to amnesty for the estimated two
million undocumented immigrants. This bill represented the single largest
overhaul to the American immigration system since the end of the Braceros program in 1964.
The object of
this paper is not to study the road to IRCA, but rather the international
response to such legislation. Much of the American scholarship on this topic
focuses solely on domestic US
politics. This research aims to place this legislation in a more international
context by studying Mexican politics immediately preceding and immediately
following the passage of the momentous immigration reform bill. This paper
consists of two parts: Part I focuses on contextualizing the Mexican political
climate that confronted Mexican politicians upon the passage of IRCA while Part
II discusses the actions taken by the Mexican government in response to the new
immigration system.
The 1980s proved to be a period of
transition for the Mexican authorities ‘ perception of migration. Prior to this
period, the Mexican population viewed migration, both internal and external, as
a positive trait that benefitted communities on both sides of the border. While
this positive view migration remains to this day, it has become tempered with
other considerations in the wake of IRCA. Following the passage of the
Simpson-Mazzoli bill, the Mexican federal government began to focus on the
negative effects of immigration in the way of human and workers’ rights
violations as well as the negative repercussions this trend had for Mexican
development. Following this realization, the Mexican government began to play a
more active role in the lives of these immigrant communities
Part I: Mexican migration
overview
Background
Beginning in 1946, the United States
and Mexican government signed a series of accords by which would become known
as the Bracero Program. This program,
which would last until 1964 provided temporary work visas to hundreds of
thousands of Mexican laborers to work in the US to fill any possible gaps in
their employment during the war period. This labor exchange significantly
increased migration between Mexico
and its northern neighbor. Although the Bracero
program ended in 1964, it had established lasting migratory channels between Mexico and the United States and much of the
migration continued in the form of undocumented travelers.
This
increase in border activity was linked to the rise of Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI) in Mexico .
ISI was an economic model based on importing unprocessed materials while
exporting finalized products. Under this system, the federal government played
an active role in the economy as a promoter of economic development, regulator
of necessary markets, investor in strategic areas, and promoter of the general
welfare of the population. In order to fulfill such responsibilities, the
government enacted several laws aimed at protecting workers in the
manufacturing and agricultural sectors. It also created several social and
educational institutions aimed at creating a more efficient and skilled labor
force.[4]
Although
the Mexican government experienced substantial economic growth from 1956-1981,
the period in which it enacted ISI policies, by the 1980s this model proved
unsustainable. The laws and policies required for this interventionist economic
policy had left the Mexican government severely in debt to its largest trading
partner, the United States .
This debt would prove critical following a dip in international petroleum
prices in 1981.[5]
Mexico
was dependent on its petroleum exports, which funded many of its policies, and
in mid 1981 the fall in petroleum prices coupled with stagnation in export
prices to create an economic crisis for the Mexican government. In response to
the economic shortfall, the Mexican government borrowed heavily from foreign
short loans market. The economic crisis that began at the outset of the 1980s
would persist throughout the rest of the decade and would result in a change
from ISI to a new economic model known as neoliberalism.
The growth of the Mexican city was a
trend closely linked to the economic models of ISI and neoliberalism, both of
which favored manufacturing and commerce. As a result, the migratory trends
that led to population growth on Mexico ’s northern border also
affected large urban centers. Although cities like Monterrey ,
Gaudalajara, and Puebla
experienced exponential growth, Mexico D.F. experienced the most pronounced
demographic explosion in these decades. In 1970, Mexico ’s national capital held 18%
of the nation’s population; by 1980, the city had swelled to house a population
16 million, or 23% of the national population, and it produced nearly 50% of
the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[6] The
process of centralization and urban growth in Mexico D.F. began with the
construction of extensive train networks around the country at the end of the
19th century but had accelerated in recent decades as the economic
models emphasized by the government favored large urban centers often at the
expense of rural populations. [7]
These concerns were all compounded
by the fact that the Mexican political system in the 1980s was run by the
political machine of the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).The PRI was a political party that
emerged from the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917). The PRI ruled Mexico as a
single party for the rest of the twentieth century. During the course of its
singe-party rule, the PRI was known for its corruption and token elections. In
the 1960s the Mexican population began to show their dissatisfaction through protests
and by the 1980s, the PRI political system was in peril.
International Cold War
Context
It is
impossible to separate the political thought confronting Mexican politicians
discussing immigration from the international, Cold War context in which it occurred.
Although traditional academic works have focused on the European and Asian events
in this conflict between East and West, the Cold War remained a real, heated
competition in Latin America in the
1980s. From the success of the Cuban
Revolution in the 1960s, the United
States retained a constant and consistent
fear of Soviet satellites in the Western hemisphere.
Senator Jackson’s
concern, as well as that of many other such critics, was due to civil unrest in
smaller Central American countries of Nicaragua ,
El Salvador , and Guatemala . United States
intelligence had believed that these revolts against corrupt and despotic governments
were inspired by Cuban and Soviet meddling and they feared that this Soviet
expansionism would spread north. The situation in Mexico ’s
southern neighbors affected Mexican diplomacy in two ways: first, it made US authorities wary of the stability of the
status quo in Mexico and
second, it inspired American politicians to view Mexico as an avenue for influencing
events in Central American republics.
This
criticism from their northern neighbor led to a diplomatic estrangement between
the US and Mexico . Perhaps
the most pronounced fallout occurred in response to the presentation of an ABC
1982 news special titled Mexico , Time of Crisis. This program, which
concluded that Mexico
found itself in the middle of a profound economic, political and social crisis
that had created a situation favorable to revolution, produced a great
discomfort among Mexican officials. Numerous reports in SRE archives document
the political backlash that this program produced among Mexican officials:
One
legislator was of the opinion that the program [Mexico , Time of Crisis] was part of an
anti-Mexican campaign by the North American press attempting to discredit the
current administration of President Jose Lopez Portillo and intimidate the
incoming president. [10]
Although Mexican politicians were
aware of many of the challenges confronting their government, they were deeply
resentful of these accusations of political unrest from various American
sources. This resentment would be voiced in several of the bi-national
congresses between the two nations and would be revisited several times in
other diplomatic settings. Mexican authorities would occasionally resist North
American pressure in order to defy these expectations.
This
situation in Central America caused US
authorities to pressure Mexican authorities to comply with their policies
towards the small southern republics. Even though the Mexican
Republic had incorporated a policy of
non-intervention into its 1917 constitution, the US
did not view their opposition to US military intervention as
justified. This pressure by US officials was made visible to the general public
on both sides of the border as diplomatic conversations were often shared with
the press. In 1984, the Mexican newspaper Excelsior
covered a speech by president Ronald Reagan where he emphasized the role of
diplomacy in convincing Mexico of the need to change it’s policy; these calls
for diplomatic solutions were coupled with threats of economic sanctions at a
time when the Mexican economy dependent on US goodwill in order to renegotiate
its debt.[11]
Financial Considerations
By 1982, the Mexican government
found itself in the intense throws of an economic recession that would last the
rest of the decade. The economic crisis had several causes including a fall in
petroleum prices, high level of public debt, stagnation of exportation prices
and volume, capital flight, and an unprecedented acceleration in inflation. [12] [13] Petroleum was one of Mexico ’s most important exports and was used,
along with foreign credit, to fund the ISI economy in Mexico . Mexico ’s foreign debt of 80 billion US dollars
made it the nation with the second highest level of foreign debt in the world
after Brazil .[14] In the wake
of this financial catastrophe, many financiers expected a devaluation of the
Mexican peso and speculated that Mexico would
nationalize its banks which led to a flight of capital in the private sector.
The financial crisis played an important role in
determining Mexican response to US
immigration policy because Mexico ’s
economic development was dependent upon US aid and because Mexican
authorities feared the potential repercussions of such legislation. During the
process of renegotiating the foreign debt – a process that would last for years
to come – the United States
pressured Mexican authorities to comply with new economic policies of free
trade. This change in the economic model would necessitate a general
deregulation of the economy and significant privatization of public works.
Under the ISI model of development, Mexico had resisted international
pressure to join free-trade organizations such as the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trades (GATT) but this policy was reversed in a 1985 speech by the
Mexican president Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado.[15] This process of economic restructuring began
during the presidency of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado and would continue into
the tenure of his successors.
In response to Mexican request for debt restructuring,
the United States
proposed that all future aid would require a Mexican economic restructuring
based on neoliberalist principles. These requests were captured in the 1985
Baker Plan, named after the then US Secretary of the Treasury, James
Baker, which required debtor nations to adopt severely curtailed budgets and
liberalize their markets to foreign trade in exchange for creditor nations
guaranteeing the continuation of loans and a lifting of protectionist barriers.[16] Mexico
had little choice in the matter given its high level of foreign owned debt and
it formally accepted the plan in May 1986; in July of the same year, Mexico would
also join GATT.
Despite the economic restructuring, or as some scholars
would argue because of it, the 1980s remained a decade of economic stagnation.
President Madrid’s tenure from 1982 to 1986 was known as el sexenio del
crecimiento cero or
“the six year term of zero growth”. [17]
President Madrid, who came into office mere months after the recession,
inherited the financial calamity from his predecessor, President Jorge Lopez
Portillo. One of his most immediate and important tasks was to stem the flight
of capital by reassuring agents in the business sector and labor organizations,
traditional alliances of the ruling PRI party. From 1982 to 1985, president Madrid launches an
austerity program in order to target the foreign debt which he declared his
first priority in office. [18]
Amid this financial
uncertainty, Mexican emigration increased as many sought stable, well paying
Jobs in response to the Mexican recession. By December 1982, the Mexican peso was devaluated for the third time
since the crisis had begun and the Mexican currency had lost 46% of its buying
power. This collapse in real salaries of Mexican households ensured that many
families and individuals from the working class were now living in poverty and
on impossible salaries, if they were lucky enough to retain their jobs. These
factors led to an increase in migration, both internal and external, within Mexico ; rural
regions were vacated as families left to urban centers or the northern border
on the promise of a living wage. Much of this migration flowed into Mexico City in the nation’s center or to the northern
states where the economy was closely linked with that of the United States
and inhabitants had an opportunity to cross the border.
Part II: Mexican Response
End of “Policy of No Policy”
“In order to
fulfill the objective of protecting the rights and interests of Mexican
nationals abroad, this administration aims to fulfill the following goals:
Improving the effectiveness of consuls….establishing mechanisms for the
communication of information between different officials within the Federal
government… intensification of multilateral efforts to codify global workers’
rights…and protect the rights of undocumented Mexican workers who reside in
neighboring countries…”
-President
Carlos Salinas de Gortari[20]
The passage above comes from
Mexican President Carlos Salinas’ reading of his international objectives
before the Mexican Congress in 1989; it represents a sharp departure from
previous administration in that it lists the rights of undocumented Mexican immigrants
as a concern for the Mexican government. Although prior administrations would
often claim to protect the rights of Mexican nationals who resided abroad, this
was the first time that the Mexican government distinguishes between documented
and undocumented migrants and claims a right to protect the latter as well as
the former. This reflects a change in Mexican attitudes towards incorporating
Mexican undocumented immigrants into their government following the passage of
IRCA.
Prior to the passage of IRCA, Mexico had adopted a policy of
acquiescence to the diplomatic goals of its most important trading partner,
especially with regards to immigration. Although the United
States and Mexico held fundamentally different
views towards international migration, Mexican officials had made little effort
to influence American policy. In 1986, Bernardo Sepulveda, the Mexican
Secretary of Foreign Relations wrote, “In any case, our country has been
largely absent in the debate over the immigration reforms in the United States .”[21] Although the U.S.-Mexico border had long been
characterized by its porous nature, Mexico had rarely made efforts to
curb migration moving north. On a few situations the Mexican government
deployed large amounts of troops to police the border but these efforts were
short lived and generally the Mexican side of the border went unpatrolled.[22] In one instance in 1954 where the Mexican
federal government deployed troops, it followed a failed attempt to renegotiate
the Bracero agreement; the deployed
troops were confronted with mob violence as thousands of workers gathered in
border cities to protest the closing of the border and shortly thereafter the
Mexican government removed the troops. [23] By the
1980s, the Mexican government had rejected any attempts to police their side of
the border. In 1989, Fernando Solana, the Secretary of Foreign Relations under
President Salinas stated that, “[Mexico] has refused and will refuse to use
force to detain the flow of Mexican migrants to the US territory and has
repeatedly denied overtures to cooperate with international efforts to
intercept migratory workers from third parties.”[24]
Although the Mexican government had
decided not to reprimand the population that attempted to establish better
lives north of the border, it also did little to protect the rights of these
migrants prior to the passage of IRCA. Many scholars have called the period
between the end of the Bracero
program and the passage of IRCA the period of “policy of no policy”, which is
to say that the Mexican government acknowledged the reality of transnational
migration across its northern border and it did little to intervene. On
occasion it would create working groups with American officials to research
this phenomenon but rarely would it do anything that actually affected the
lives of immigrants. The Mexican government during this period did little more
than repeat its argument that undocumented migration was an inevitable result
of two countries of differing development sharing a border and that the US should come
to terms with this reality. [25] Operating
under this belief, Mexican authorities did little to protect the
undocumented Mexican population residing abroad; until the mid-1980s that is. It
also allowed them to retain credibility when they asked to United States not to interfere in Mexican domestic
policy since they were respecting US sovereignty with regards to its
own domestic policy.[26] This
policy of non-intervention was also due in large part to the acknowledged
impotence of the Mexican government when it came to influencing what was perceived
to be US
domestic policy.
Due to the lengthiness of the
legislative process surrounding the bill, several interests group within Mexico had
organized to express their dissatisfaction with what they perceived as an
attack on the basic human rights as well as the attacks on labor rights of
undocumented immigrants by the time that the Simpson-Mazzoli bill had been
enacted. In 1985, the Mexican Senate convened a series of town-hall style
meetings to gauge public reception of the proposed Simpson-Mazzoli bill that
seemed to be gaining traction. In the second of these meetings, the audience
recommended that the Federal government needed to take a more active role in
educating the Mexican population, especially those from the border region,
about the protections available to them.[27] This
sentiment was conveyed in the other meetings held; far from wishing to deter
migration, the population voiced their desire to aid the migratory population
and ensure their protection.
This message
had gained a militant overtone in the northern border region where protests had
been a regular occurrence for years. On July 1, 1984, the presidential
candidate Jesse Jackson led a protest of two thousand marchers from the border
to Tijuana in
opposition to the Simpson-Mazzoli bill among other things.[28] The
northern regions would also be riled up in 1985 following the death of 12 year
old Humberto Carrillo by a US
border patrol agent. Several marches were held in San
Ysidro , California as well as in Tijuana , Baja California ,
Mexico demanding not only
the dismissal of the agent responsible for the death but also an end to the US efforts to
militarize the border.[29] The populations
of Mexican descent on both sides of the border were dissatisfied with the
current efforts to deal with the shared border and they clamored for their
government to play a more active role in determining the fate of this migratory
population.
By the late 1980s, the influence of
these organized efforts had become apparent as diplomats began to reflect the
language of expressed by their constituents. By 1988, the outgoing
undersecretary of Foreign Relations Alfonso de Rosenzweig-Diaz advised the
president that, “The protection of Mexicans while abroad is one of the
priorities for the Mexican Consular Service; it is a responsibility that has
acquired increased importance in the United States due to the large number of
compatriots that reside there or that migrate there as temporary labor.” [30]
Whenever President Madrid would speak to the issue, he would emphasize his role
in drawing US
attention to protecting labor and social rights of undocumented Mexicans.
Public pressure had inspired Mexican officials to adopt a more pronounced,
pro-immigrant stance in these discussions.
Some argue that this change in
rhetoric did not extend past words. The scholar Francisco Alba argues that no
significant change in the Mexican approach towards dealing with undocumented
migration to the United
States was achieved until the signing of the
North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994. [31] While I
agree that the most significant change in Mexican legislation occurred after
President Madrid had left office, I would argue that President Madrid began a
process of consular reform that paved the way for future change; moreover, the
responsiveness of the Mexican federal government to popular opinion was a new
development that resulted from the internal and external pressure that the
governing PRI party felt during the economic crisis of the 1980s.
Consular Reform
Much of the
new found responsibility for protecting immigrants’ rights in the United States
fell to the Mexican consuls; as a representative of the Mexican government,
these offices were easily and quickly adapted to address the new concerns that
rose in response to the passage of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. Once passed, the
Simpson-Mazzoli bill created a special legal council within the Justice
Department to address discrimination complaints. Although this resource would
be made available only to US citizens and foreigners that had begun the process
of naturalization, this was one avenue of recourse available to vulnerable
populations and consulates were educated on how to access it. [32] The
fact that this office could provide aid to populations that had begun the
process of naturalization made it relevant to the undocumented immigrants that
had arrived in the US prior
to January 1, 1982 – only immigrants that had been continuously present in the United States
from some period prior to this date were allowed to stay. Consuls were issued
several packets of information detailing the process of regularizing ones
status and the resources available to someone once they decided to do so. Since
immigrants that wished to regularize their status needed to demonstrate that
they did not have any prior legal infractions, the Mexican consulates also
played an active role in this process as they helped facilitate the transfer of
information.
In order to
address this new portfolio of responsibilities, the Mexican consulates and
embassies needed restructuring. The expansion of the consulate budget began in
the early 1980s; Between December 1980 and April 1981, the SRE increased the
allotted budget to the 39 Mexican consulates in the US from 125 thousand US dollars to
800 thousand dollars. [33]
The consulate restructuring that occurred under the Madrid administration was not limited to
mere budgetary increases. The 40 Mexican consulates in the United States
were reorganized geographically in order to best serve the Mexican population
abroad. [34]
In addition to geographic shuffling, the SRE instituted a new program that
compiled, processed and circulated information to the consulates and would
inform them about their responsibilities as well as explain instructions. [35] This
process of restructuring would continue under the subsequent administration
under Salinas .[36]
In addition
to putting new legal resources in place for Mexican immigrants in the United States , consuls also attempted to
establish cultural links between migrant and Hispanic communities in the United States .
This served to increase consulate access to resources that could provide legal
aid to undocumented migrants. [37] This
team up was seen in events and protests against the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. These
efforts to bolster cultural connections between transient and permanent US populations
was largely inspired by similar organizations that had arisen to oppose the
1980s US legislation. Labor representatives from the AFL-CIO were invited to Mexico to meet
with representatives from the Confederacion
de Trabajadores Mexicanos and discuss the flow of labor between the two
countries and how to oppose massive deportations. [38] These
meetings evolved into more lasting collaborations across borders. Inspired by
the success of these movements, the Mexican government sought to incorporate
their strategy in order to gain access to advocate networks with similar
interests on the other side of the border.
Legislative and electoral
reform
Another avenue for pursuing change
in the U.S.-Mexico migratory system was legal reform. In 1996, following several high profile
attacks on Mexican migrants in the United States, Mexico amended its
constitution to explicitly list the freedom to migrate as a fundamental right. This
change came in the form of article 11 to the nation’s constitution which
guaranteed the free movement of citizens across national territory. [39] This
was an indication of Mexican government’s realization of the impossible task of
attempting to prevent emigration. Although this did not end the formal
regulation and process of crossing borders, it did lay out the government’s
position in support of migrant population.
In the same year, the Mexican
government enacted a constitutional amendment that enfranchised Mexican
citizens who resided abroad. [40] This
reform, which allowed Mexican citizens to vote for in Mexican presidential
elections while abroad, was part of a larger campaign by the PRI to enact
populist measures but it also reflected the changing views of immigrants’
rights in Mexico .
Mexican emigrants, regardless of their legal status while abroad, now retained
their right to fully participate in Mexican politics and retain their links to
the Mexican government.
This newfound concern with the
wellbeing of immigrants was also reflected in the words of Fernando Solana, the
Secretary of Foreign Relations under President Salinas:
The
Protection and defense of the rights and interests of Mexican citizens abroad
constitutes a priority for the Republic…In the last year we addressed the needs
of over 30,000 cases of protection, 8,000 visits to hospitals, work places,
detention centers and prisons. [41]
New approach to development
Following the failure of the ISI
model in the early 1980s, Mexico
was forced to reconsider its economic policies both by internal pressure –
demands for jobs and an end to excessive inflation – as well as by external
pressure – usually in the form of US banks. As a result of this situation, the
entire economic model began to be questioned.
Prior to this
transition emigration was viewed as beneficial to nation’s economy because it
allowed for the acquisition of worker experience using agricultural machinery,
remittances, and a relief valve for the high levels of unemployment. [42] These explained, in part, the Mexican
government’s lax attempts at policing the border. Beginning in the 1980s,
however, this view changed. Anthropologists and economists began studying the
negative impact that migration had on developing communities as it stripped
them of their working age population and created cycles of dependency on
remittances that led to inflation. No longer did Mexican authorities believe
that migration, whether permanent or temporary, contributed to the economic
development of impoverished regions. [43] Suddenly,
the need to stem the migratory tide became a priority for the government.
In order to
address these economic causes of massive migration, the Mexican government
began to shift its focus away from stimulating urban centers to stimulating
developing regions. For the last few decades, rural populations had flocked to
cities creating a demographic explosion. In the 1980s, the Mexican government
refocused its efforts on reducing the exodus of Mexicans from rural and
developing regions. The economic development plans of the Madrid administration listed population
retention, reorientation and relocation as priorities. [44] Under
this plan, the Mexican government attempted to decentralize the industrial and
manufacturing centers of the country and move these factors away from the
cities.[45] [46] This
plan attempted to stimulate economic growth by identifying regions and offering
incentives to private investors to create industrial parks
These efforts
were intensified under the Salinas
administration. In his Plan Nacional de
Poblacion released in 1989, President Salinas described his objectives to,
“distribute the population in a national territory, and encourage responsive
development where regions specialize in producing goods and services according
to their strengths. I look to stem the tide of hyper-concentration in the large
metropolitan centers.” [47] The
government achieved these stated goals by attempting to integrate metropolitan
zones with other regions of having regions specialize in areas where they had a
comparative advantage. The administration also incorporated private businesses
in the creation and operation of rural and urban public goods as it privatized
significant parts of the economy. [48]
Two Case Studies: Monterrey
Monterrey
While the Federal government
attempted to redefine its position in regards to immigration, Monterrey was able to play a unique role. As
one of the largest urban centers in the northern states, Monterrey had become an integral part of
cyclical migration chains by which returning migrants and new migrants seeking
to reunite with family members would originate from or pass through. As such,
the city of Monterrey was the place of origin
for many of the immigrants in the southwester United States . In the 1980s, Monterrey elected officials knew of the antagonistic
relationship between US citizens and migrant populations in these US border
states . [50] In
response to these protests, Monterrey developed
close relationship with its sister-cities Houston ,
Dallas , Fort Worth ,
San Antonio and Los Angeles .
[51] These
cities would go on to refuse to work with Immigrant and Naturalization Services
in the creation of detention centers for undocumented immigrants.
Conclusion
The transformation of the
Simpson-Mazzoli bill into IRCA was one of the most profound changes to the
unique U.S.-Mexico relationship. It directly transformed US immigration
procedure and inspired a fundamental repositioning on the part of the Mexican
government. This is often an issue that is examined within a purely domestic
context at the expense of the diplomatic history that surrounded the issue.
While this
paper is an attempt to advocate for a more nuanced view of the international
context of the 1980s in which the US-Mexico confrontations played out, it is by
no means an attempt to absolve the Mexican government of any negative policies they
enacted during this time period. I have listed several examples of positive
Mexican policy enactments that benefitted a vulnerable population but that is
not to say there were no instances of intransigence, mismanagement, and general
apathy with regards to the wellbeing of migrants. The Mexican government
retained many of the corrupt qualities that had defined it in decades prior and
responded to public pressure slowly.
We now find ourselves 30 years
removed from the political maneuverings of the 1980s but the “immigration
problem” has persisted and intensified. Today there are now an estimated 12
million undocumented immigrants in the United States . This burgeoning
population has inspired several attempts to correct the issue in the past
decade. Much of the current debate closely mirrors debates that surrounded the
Simpson-Mazzoli bill. Representatives and Senators continue to focus on
increasing border security, dealing with visa limits, and granting amnesty.
Thirty years have come and gone but the discussion has yet to progress.
Addendum
I would like to take this space to
thank the Fox Family for this wonderful journey that they allowed me to embark
upon. When I arrived in Mexico
in August 2012, I arrived at a time of transition. Mexico was in the middle of a
historic presidential race that saw the PRI return to power after 12 years out
of office. I witnessed the rallies and significant mobilization in opposition
to the victory of President Enrique Peña Nieto. I was also in Mexico to witness the country’s response to the
death of the Columbian President Hugo Chavez; although the figure had little
direct relationship to Mexico ,
his status as a Latin American icon meant that Mexico
responded to his passing in a manner quite different from the United States . None
of this would have been possible without the support of the Fox Family.
[1] Note on the
text: This work draws heavily from many Mexican government sources. As such,
many of the quotes included in this work were originally recorded in Spanish
and have been translated into English by the author. The original, untranslated
text will be included in the footnotes
[2]“La posible aprobación de una nueva ley de inmigración en los EUA ha generado diversas acciones de diferentes organismos e instituciones mexicanas, tendientes a analizar de fondo el problema migratorio y las posibles repercusiones de una legislación sobre la materia.”
“Informe Sobre los Acontecimientos en América del Norte.”
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, May 1985. p.23
[3] Mario Margulis and Rodolfo Tuiran, Desarollo
y Poblacion de La Frontera Norte: El Caso de Reynosa (Mexico: El Colegio de
Mexico, 1986). Pp.36
[4] Inelvo Moreno Alvarez, Desarollo Economico y Proceso Legislativo, “La
Intervencion del Sector Publico en la economía: un análisis comparativo de
periodo de desarrollo estabilizador frente al neoliberalismo económico”. (PRD,
2006). Pp. 105
[5] Alfonso Corona Rentería
and Juan Sánchez Gleason, Integración del
norte de México a la economía nacional: perspectivas y oportunidades
([México, D.F].: SPP, Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 1989). P.
27
[6] Ibid., P. 21
[7] Ibid., P. 19
[8] Quoted Translated from:
Si el gobierno (mexicano) se desestabilizara por la baja de los precios del
petróleo, las deudas internacional y la disensión interna, podría haber una
revolución y nos podríamos encontrar con el gobierno castrista en nuestra
frontera.”
“El Objetivo Real de La Labor Castro-Soviética
En América Latina Es México: Senador Jackson (D),” El Universal,
February 21, 1983.
[9] Original Source: “Mexico Is a Soviet Target, Senator
Jackson Claims.” San Francisco Chronicle. February 4, 1982.
This article was recorded in letter by the Mexican Consul in LA,
Luis F. Orci, in a daily report to the Secretary of Foreign Relations.
[10] ABC Producio Un Programa
de Television Titulados “Mexico, Tiempo de Crisis,” July 29, 1982, SER.
[11] Danuta Walewska, Rzezpolita
(diario) 4 de Julio 1984: El “Excelsior” Sobre La Directiva Secreta 124";
Washington Plantea Una Brutal Injeraencia, n.d.
[12] Guadalupe Beatriz Acuna
de Pena, “Migración y Fuerza de Trabajo En La Frontera Norte de México,” Estudios
Fronterizos 1, no. 2 (December 1983). Pp. 109
[14] Isabelle Rousseau, México, una revolución silenciosa?: élites
gubernamentales y proyecto de modernización, 1970-1995 (México: El Colegio
de México, Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 2001). Pp.143
[17]Inelvo Moreno Alvarez, Desarollo Economico y Proceso Legislativo, “La
Intervención del Sector Publico en la economía: un análisis comparativo de
periodo de desarrollo estabilizador frente al neoliberalismo económico”. (PRD, 2006). Pp. 105
[19] Azucena Valderrabano and
Blanche Petrich, “Afectara La Carta Silva a Mas de 30 Mil Mexicanos,” Uno
Mas Uno, January 14, 1982.
[20] Objetivos de La Acción Internacional de México En El
Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 1989- 1994. Mexico , D.F.: Secretaría de
Relaciones Exteriores, 1989. p.21
[22]Alba, FranciscoConsejo
Nacional de Población (Mexico),”Migración Internacional y Políticas Publicas”,
El Estado de La Migración: Las
Políticas Públicas Ante Los Retos de La Migración Mexicana a Estados Unidos,
1. ed (México, D.F: Consejo Nacional de Población, 2009), pp. 26
[23] Morris, Milton D., and Brookings Institution.
Curbing Illegal Immigration: a Staff Paper. Washington , D.C: Brookings Institution,
1982.
[24] Solana, Fernando. Informe presentado por el
secretario de Relaciones Exteriores al Senado de la República. México:
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1989. p.22
[25] Mexico ,
and Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
1982-1988: reunión de autoevaluación. México: La Secretaría, 1988. p. 22
[26] Francisco Alba, “La Política Migratoria Mexicana Después
de IRCA,” Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos 14, no. 1 (ene-abr 1999). P.
16
[27] “Informe Sobre Los Acontecimientos En America
Del Norte.” Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, June 1985. Archivo General de
la Nacion [Mexico ].
P.32
[28] “Dirección General Para America Del Norte.” Secretaría de
Relaciones Exteriores, July 1984. Archivo General de la Nacion [Mexico ]. P.13
[29] “Informe Sobre Los Acontecimientos En America
Del Norte.” Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, June 1985. Archivo General de
la Nacion [Mexico ].
P.30-32
[30] Original quote: La protección de los mexicanos que se
encuentran en el extranjero es una de las tareas prioritarias del Servicio Consular Mexicano, tarea que
adquiere toda su significación en los Estados Unidos por el gran numero de
compatriotas que residen allá o que emigran temporalmente para buscar trabajo.”
Mexico ,
and Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
1982-1988: reunión de autoevaluación. México: La Secretaría, 1988. p. 21
[31] Alba, Francisco,Consejo
Nacional de Población (Mexico),”Migración Internacional y Políticas Publicas”,
El Estado de La Migración: Las
Políticas Públicas Ante Los Retos de La Migración Mexicana a Estados Unidos,
1. ed (México, D.F: Consejo Nacional de Población, 2009), pp. 26-27
[32] Barbara Strickland,
“Sintesis Del Proyecto de Ley Simpson-Rodino,” Foro Internacional 27,
no. 3 (107) (March 1987). P.443-446
[34] Mexico ,
and Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
1982-1988: reunión de autoevaluación. México: La Secretaría, 1988. p. 21
[35] Mexico ,
and Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
1982-1988: reunión de autoevaluación. México: La Secretaría, 1988. p. 21
[36] Leticia Calderón
Chelius, La Dimensión Política de La Migración Mexicana, 1. ed,
Contemporánea Sociología (México, D.F: Instituto de Investigaciones Dr.
José Luis Mora, 2002). P.53
[37] Mexico ,
and Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
1982-1988: reunión de autoevaluación. México: La Secretaría, 1988. p. 21
[41] Solana, Fernando. Informe presentado por el
secretario de Relaciones Exteriores al Senado de la República. México:
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1989. p.21
[42] Monica Verea C.,
“Posibles Alternativas Del Gobierno Mexicano Ante La Aprobacion de La Ley Simpson-Rodino,”
Foro Internacional 27, no. 3 (107) (March 1987). P. 468
[43] Cornellius, Wayne. “Immigration, Mexican Development
Policy, and the Future of US-Mexican Relations.” Working Papers in US-
Mexican Studies 8 (1981).
[44] Ana Maria Chavez, La
Nueva Dinámica de La Migración Interna En México, 1970-1990 (Morelos, Mexico:
UNAM, 1998), pp. 328
[47] “objetivo era distribuir la población en el territorio
nacional que respondiera al potencial de desarrollo de las distintas regiones
del país tomando en consideración la migración tanto interno como de carácter
internacional. Busco frenar las inercias de la hiperconcentración en las grandes zonas
metropolitanas” Ana Maria Chavez, La Nueva Dinámica de La Migración Interna En
México, 1970-1990 (Morelos, Mexico: UNAM, 1998), pp. 328
[50] “Detienen En Empresas
Tejanas a Sesenta Indocumentados,” Excelsior, July 21, 1985, sec. En los
Estados.
[51] “Actas de Cabildo:
Monterrey y San Antonio Son Ciudades Hermanas” (Gobierno Municipal de
Monterrey, August 26, 1983).